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Abstract  
 
This study analyzes the causes of civil wars in the Congo since independence and 
investigates how the Congo case fits the model of civil war proposed by Collier and 
Hoeffler.  Five conclusions arise from this case study.  First, the level and growth rate of 
national income increased the risk of war by reducing the cost of organizing rebellions 
and the government’s ability to counteract the rebellions.  Second, while regional ethnic 
dominance served as a basis for mobilization of rebellions, ethnic antagonism was also an 
obstacle to the expansion of civil wars beyond the province of origin.  Third, while 
natural resource dependence was a significant determinant of civil wars in the DRC, it is 
the geographic concentration of natural resources and their unequal distribution that made 
the Congo particularly prone to civil war.  Fourth, the government’s ability to counteract 
rebellions depended more on external support than on the government’s military and 
economic capacity.  Fifth, discriminatory nationality laws, disruptions in the ethnic 
balance of the eastern region caused by the influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees in 1994, 
and shared ethnicity between rebels and neighboring regimes—variables which are not 
included in the Collier-Hoeffler model—were significant determinants of the outbreak of 
civil wars in the 1990s. 
 
Paper prepared for the Yale University/World Bank project on “The Economics and 
Politics of Civil Wars.” 
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1.  Introduction 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced several rebellions and 
wars since its independence in 1960.  These wars share common features while exhibiting 
important differences with regard to their causes.   The purpose of this chapter is to 
analyze the causes of eight wars in the Congo and to investigate how the Congo case fits 
the core Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2002).1    
Five conclusions arise from this case study.  First, the level and growth rate of 
income reduced the cost of organizing rebellions and, to a limited extent, the 
government’s ability to counteract the rebellions.  Second, while regional ethnic 
dominance served as a basis for mobilization of civil wars, ethnic antagonism was also an 
obstacle to the expansion of these wars beyond the province of origin.  Third, while 
natural resource dependence, as predicted by the Collier-Hoeffler model, was a 
significant determinant of civil wars in the DRC, it is not dependence per se that 
motivated the conflicts, but rather the geographic concentration of natural resources and 
their unequal distribution.  Fourth, the government’s ability to counteract rebellions 
depended more on external support than on the government’s military and economic 
capacity.  Fifth, discriminatory nationality laws, disruptions in the ethnic balance of the 
eastern region caused by the influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees in 1994, and shared 
ethnicity between rebels and neighboring regimes—variables which are not included in 
the Collier-Hoeffler model—were significant determinants of the outbreak of civil wars 
in the 1990s. 
We organize the study as follows.  The next section analyzes eight civil wars that 
occurred in the DRC since 1960.  Section 3 examines the performance of the Collier-
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Hoeffler model in predicting the Congo’s wars and distinguishes cases that fit the model 
from those that remain puzzles to be explained.2  Section 4 draws conclusions based on 
these findings.  We conclude that some factors in the Collier-Hoeffler model are 
important in explaining wars in the Congo, while a number of critical determinants of the 
timing and location of rebellions are missing from the model.   
 
2.  The wars in the Congo since 1960 
 The main features of the eight wars discussed in this section are summarized in 
Table 1.  Below, we provide an analysis of the context and the causes of these wars. 
 
2.1 The Katanga secession war: 11 July 1960 – 14 January 1963 
(i) The movement for Katangan autonomy 
 The Katangan secessionist movement dates from the colonial era.  Under the 
Congo Free State, Katanga was administered by the privately owned Comité Spécial du 
Katanga until 1910 when its administration was transferred to a vice governor general 
(Meditz and Merrill 1994).  In 1933, administrative reorganization brought Katanga in 
accordance with the other provinces under the central colonial administration despite 
strong resentment by Katanga’s European residents.  Because of the diversity and 
abundance of its natural riches, Katanga attracted a large number of Europeans and 
accounted for over 30 percent of the total non-African population in the Congo in 1955 
(see Table A1 in the appendix).  However, only seven percent of these (2,310 out of 
31,847) could be regarded as genuine settlers, the rest consisted of temporarily employed 
civil servants, industrialists, technicians, and missionaries (Lemarchand 1964: 233-234).  
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The province is the sole producer of copper (70 percent of national production) and 
cobalt.  At independence, Katanga accounted for 75 percent of the Congo’s mineral 
output, about 50 percent of total national resources, and roughly 20 percent of the 
government’s total budgetary expenditures.   The province is also the home of the 
dominant ethnic groups of the Lunda, Baluba of Katanga, and Bayeke, who historically 
claimed to be unfairly represented in the central government.  The other important feature 
of the province is the early rapid development of a large urban (non-agricultural) wage-
earning population (36% in 1959, see Table A1), which served as a base for political 
mobilization by leaders of the secessionist movement.   
 
(ii) Ethnic character of political parties in the pre-independence era 
 The Katangan secession war was influenced by the ethnic character of the 
political parties that developed in the period leading to independence.  The main parties 
that contested power at independence were polarized along ethnic lines, except for 
Lumumba’s Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement, MNC), 
which advocated national unity and transcended ethnic affiliation (Young 1965).  In 
Katanga, the leading political force was the Confédération des Associations Tribales du 
Katanga (CONAKAT), created on 4 October 1958, whose mission was to defend the 
interests of the “authentic Katangans” (mainly the Lunda, Baluba of Katanga, and 
Bayeke) against the threat of “strangers,” mostly from Kasai (Lulua and Baluba from 
Kasai) recruited by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) to work in the mines.  
The creation of CONAKAT was triggered by the outcome of the communal elections of 
December 1957 in which none of the four elected leaders was an “authentic Katangan.”  
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Three were from Kasai and one from Kivu.  The xenophobia of native Katangans in 
regard to ethnic “strangers” was promoted by urban mining workers seeking to protect 
their employment as well as the political elite (led by Tshombe) seeking to advance their 
political agenda. 
 
(iii) Disputes over constitutional orientation: unitarism, federalism, and secessionism 
 
 Disputes about the constitutional orientation of the country were a central factor 
giving rise to the Katangan secessionist movement, and generated  antagonism within the 
national political elite and between nationalists and Belgium. The Loi Fondamentale, the 
transitional constitution of the country at independence, provided for a parliamentary 
democracy that ceded substantial autonomy to the provinces.  The constitution left 
significant ambiguity with regard to the division of power between the president and the 
prime minister and with regard to the control of the central authority over provincial 
administrations.  Provincial leaders exploited these ambiguities to advance their political 
interests.   
 Prime Minister Lumumba and his party advocated a unitary and centralized 
Congo state as the expression of true national independence.  In contrast, Lumumba’s 
opponents, led by CONAKAT president Tshombe, wanted secession or at least broad 
independence of the provinces from the central government.  Tshombe believed that 
provincial sovereignty was a means of achieving fair distribution of resources based on 
each province’s needs and contribution to national wealth.  Tshombe stated: “We want a 
relation between development and people, a share on the basis of the contribution to the 
development and to the needs created by it” (Gérard-Libois, 1963: 47).  Kasavubu, 
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president of the country and of the Alliance of the Bankongo (Alliance de Bakongo, 
ABAKO), also shared Tshombe’s views, supported the organization of the Congo into a 
federal system, and at times threatened secession. 
 
(iv) Relations with Belgium and the West 
 Lumumba’s view was that the independent Congo should cooperate with its 
former colonizer and other Western countries on an equal footing while preserving 
national sovereignty.  In contrast, Tshombe wanted to keep a patrimonial relationship 
with Belgium: “Whether a federal Congo with a Katanga state is possible or not, Katanga 
in any case seeks community with Belgium” (Gérard-Libois, 1963: 33).  Tshombe was 
used as a straw man by Belgium to advance neocolonial interests.   
 Lumumba’s nationalist views attracted animosities from the Belgian government 
as well as from Belgian financial interests.  His socialist leanings generated antagonism 
from Western powers, including the United States and even the United Nations.  This 
nationalism ultimately cost him his life as he was seen as an obstacle to Belgian 
neocolonialism and a threat to the Western anti-communism agenda in Africa. 
 
(v) Trigger factors of the secessionist war 
 Congolese soldiers had expected that, following independence, they would 
replace Belgians in leadership positions.  This was  a change which Belgians were not 
ready to accept.  On 5 July 1960, Gérard Jansens, commander-in-chief of the Congolese 
army, declared that there was no question of Africanizing the command of the army: 
“Before independence = after independence,” he said (De Witte 2001: 6).  Following a 
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special meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 8, Lumumba took steps to Africanize 
the officer corps, naming Kasaian Victor Lundula as commander-in-chief of the army 
(named Armée Nationale Congolaise, ANC), Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu as chief of 
staff, and the Belgian Colonel Henniquian as chief adviser of the ANC. 
 On July 8, Congolese elements of the ANC in Kongolo revolted against their 
Belgian officers.  The following day, Congolese civilians in Kabolo tried to stop the 
departure of a train evacuating Belgians.  Panic rose among Europeans, and Belgium 
decided to employ forces to evacuate Belgian nationals.   
 Tshombe seized the moment to declare the autonomy of Katanga.  He argued that 
he needed to restore order to prevent the political chaos in the central government from 
disrupting Katanga’s economic and administrative system.  On July 11, despite attempts 
by some Belgian officials to dissuade him, Tshombe proclaimed the total independence 
of Katanga, but kept in place economic ties with Belgium.  Although the Belgian 
government did not officially recognize the Katangan secession, it nonetheless strongly 
supported Tshombe’s government militarily, financially, and diplomatically (Gibbs 
1991).  Belgian troops prevented attacks by the ANC against Katanga, and Belgium 
established consular relations with Tshombe’s government. 
 Lumumba’s appeal for assistance from the United Nations was ignored.  Instead, 
Belgium, the United States, and the United Nations took advantage of the Katangan 
secession to undermine Lumumba’s regime.  Lumumba threatened to call for help from 
countries of the Socialist bloc.  Western governments reached the conclusion that no pro-
Western government could come to power in the Congo with Lumumba in office (or in 
opposition, given his strong popular support).  It was then decided that Lumumba had to 
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be eliminated physically; he was assassinated on 17 January 1961 in a plot orchestrated 
by Belgians.3 
 After Lumumba’s death, the Belgian attitude toward Katangan secession changed 
significantly.  The Belgian government held the position that the integrity of the 
Congolese territory had to be preserved in a federal system.  However, Tshombe refused 
to participate in the post-Lumumba government led by Ileo.  Tshombe’s insistence on 
separation caused the diplomatic isolation of his Katangan government.   
 In addition to diplomatic isolation, the Katangan secession was handicapped by 
the antagonism between the self-declared “authentic Katangese” and other ethnic groups, 
especially the Baluba from northern Katanga.  In January 1961, the Association of the 
Luba People of Katanga (BALUBAKAT) proclaimed the secession of Northern Katanga.  
On 21 February 1961, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for measures to stop 
the war in the Congo by authorizing the use of force if necessary.  United Nations forces 
eventually defeated Tshombe’s rebels in January 1963. 
 
2.2 The Kasai secession war: 8 August 1960 – 2 February 1962 
 The secessionist movement in the Kasai has some similarities with that of 
Katanga.  It was primarily driven by three interrelated factors: the Lulua-Baluba (Kasai) 
conflict, ideological divergence between Lumumba and Kalonji (a Muluba) over the 
constitutional orientation of the country (unitary vs. separatism), and the struggle for the 
control of mineral resources in the Kasai region.   
 
 
 8
(i) Mineral resources  
 Known as the “diamond state,” southern Kasai has large reserves of both gem 
quality and industrial diamonds.  Until the mid-1970s, the Congo was the single largest 
producer of industrial diamonds, averaging about one-third of world total output (Kaplan 
1978: 224).  However, unlike Katanga, the Kasai region did not have longstanding 
backing from a Belgian settler community.  Therefore, it received no support from the 
West. 
 
(ii) Ideological differences 
 The Kasai secession was led by Albert Kalonji, one of the prominent founders of 
the MNC along with Lumumba.  The MNC split in two factions in July 1959 over 
political differences between Lumumba, on the one hand, and the moderate leaders Ileo 
and Ngalula and trade union leader Cyrille Adoula, on the other hand.  These dissidents 
accused Lumumba of communistic and autocratic tendencies.  As their attempts to 
replace party president Lumumba with Albert Kalonji failed, they formed a separate wing 
of the MNC led by Kalonji.  The dissident wing became known as MNC-Kalonji, in 
opposition to MNC-Lumumba.  Kalonji espoused Tshombe’s opposition to a centralized 
system.    
 
(iii) The Lulua-Baluba ethnic conflict 
The Kasai secession can be traced to the territorial expansion of the Baluba 
beyond southern Kasai to the Lulua area in the late-nineteenth century, which created 
animosities between the Baluba and the Lulua.  Because of scarcity of cultivable land, the 
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Baluba moved to Luluabourg (in Lulua land) in the early 1920s and eventually dominated 
most clerical colonial jobs.  The fear of domination by the Baluba prompted the creation 
of the Association of Lulua-Frères in 1951 by a Lulua chief, Sylvain Mangole Kalamba.   
The antagonism between the Lulua and Baluba was exacerbated in December 
1957 when the Baluba won the municipal elections in Luluabourg (today’s Kananga).  In 
1959, the Lulua regrouped and won the legislative elections, thus securing the majority in 
the provincial parliament.  
The relationship between Baluba and Lulua reached a crisis when the local 
administration proposed to resettle Baluba farmers from Lulua land (an economically 
booming center province) back to their impoverished homeland in southern Kasai.  This 
provoked a reaction from the Baluba that escalated into the first deadly conflict on 11 
October 1959. 
 The government sent an investigative team to the area and organized a conference 
between government representatives and leaders of the two ethnic groups.  At the 
conference it was suggested that some 100,000 Baluba should return from Lulua land to 
their homeland in southern Kasai to avoid further conflict.  While a large number of 
Baluba moved to southern Kasai, tension continued to escalate.   
 Kalonji was disappointed by MNC-Lumumba’s support of the Lulua in Kasai.  
Until the latter part of 1959, the MNC-Lumumba had kept a neutral stand in the conflict 
between Lulua and Baluba.  However, in a bid to secure majority seats in the Kasai 
legislative assembly, the MNC-Lumumba entered into an alliance with the Lulua and 
defeated the MNC-Kalonji (Lemarchand 1964: 209; CRISP 1962).   
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 Kalonji exploited these local tensions and the chaos in the central government to 
declare the secession of southern Kasai.  The secessionist war was eventually put down in 
February 1962 by government forces after some 3,000 to 7,000 thousand people were 
killed.  These figures include combat deaths as well as ethnic massacres. 
 
2.3 The Kwilu rebellion: 22 January 1964 – 31 December 1965 
(i) The political and ideological background 
 In the post-Lumumba period, the United Nations invested diplomatic efforts to 
press for national reconciliation and unification of the Congo (CRISP 1962).  The United 
Nations organized a conference including parliamentarians and leaders of the provincial 
governments of Katanga, South Kasai, Haut Congo, and Kinshasa in a neutral venue at 
Lovanium University.  From the conference, a new central government was formed led 
by Adoula, who had unanimous approval from parliament.  Adoula formed a diverse 
government, including such key pro-Lumumbists as Gigenza and Gbenye (CRISP 1963).  
To appease regionalist demands, the Adoula government submitted to parliament an 
amendment to the Loi Fondamentale aimed at restructuring the country into 21 
autonomous provinces (up from the six provinces initially created by the Loi 
Fondamentale).  The amendment was promulgated on 27 April 1962.   
 While the Adoula government tried to find a constitutional solution to the political 
crisis in Congo, the opposition organized itself with the aim of a revolutionary overthrow 
of the regime.4  Pierre Mulele led the Kwilu rebellion while the Conseil National de 
Libération (National Liberation Council, CNL) organized the eastern rebellion (see 
further below).5 
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 One of the most dedicated Lumumba supporters, Mulele, was Secretary General 
of the radical wing of the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) of Gizenga in 1959-1960 and 
served as Minister of Education in the Lumumba government.  He also served as 
representative of the Gizenga’s Stanleyville provincial government in Egypt and in 
socialist countries.  Having sojourned in Peking, Mulele was influenced by Maoist 
ideology. 
 At the end of the Stanleyville government in August 1961, Mulele refused 
national reconciliation and chose exile, during which he perfected his revolutionary 
ideology and prepared his strategies for organizing a peasant guerilla force.  Mulele 
accused the central government of having sold out to the interests of the West and 
advocated a second “liberating independence,” which attracted enthusiastic support from 
rural masses. 
 
(ii) Support for the rebellion: Ethnic base with no mineral resource base 
 Mulele was from the Mbunda ethnic group while Gizenga was an ethnic Mpende, 
both groups were from the Kwilu province and claimed to be marginalized by the central 
government.  The ethnic orientation of the Mulelist rebellion facilitated recruitment of 
combatants but also prevented the rebellion from gaining ground beyond the Mbunda-
Mpende territory.   
 Unlike the Katangan and Kasai rebellions, the Kwilu rebellion was not motivated 
by the control of provincial mineral resources.  Thus, the rebellion could not count on 
external economic interests for support.  The war effort was entirely supported by the 
local population. 
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 There are no specific factors that triggered the Kwilu rebellion.  Upon his return 
from exile in July 1963, Mulele mobilized and trained his combatants who were 
subjected to a rigid code of discipline.  The Mulelist rebels posed stiff resistance to 
government troops despite the rudimentary nature of their military equipment.  The 
rebellion was eventually defeated in December 1965, leaving only pockets of isolated 
resistance in the rural area.  
 
2.4 The eastern rebellion: 15 April 1964 – 1 July 1966 
(i) The political context 
 The Adoula government failed in its mission of national unification and instead 
became a vehicle of recolonization of the Congo by Belgium via military occupation and 
control of the economy.  Antagonism between the parliament and the government – this 
time with the president and the prime minister on the same side – led President Kasavubu 
to suspend the parliament on 29 September 1963.  The same day, opposition nationalist 
parties opened an extraordinary conference that ended on October 3 with the creation of 
the CNL whose objective was to overthrow the Adoula government and to achieve “total 
and effective decolonization of the Congo thus far dominated by a coalition of foreign 
powers” (Vanderlinden, et al. 1980: 124). 
 
(ii) The ideological factor 
 The leaders of the CNL fled to Brazzaville and formed a cartel of Lumumbist-
nationalist parties, the most important ones being MNC-Lumumba led by Gbenye and 
PSA led by Gizenga (Vanderlinden, et al. 1980).  The CNL had a socialist orientation 
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with both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese leanings.  This socialist orientation proved useful 
in mobilizing the masses against the central government, which was accused of  selling 
out to capitalist interests, but it also prevented the CNL from obtaining foreign assistance. 
 
(iii) Organization of the rebellion 
 In January 1964, the CNL sent Gaston Soumialot and Laurent Kabila to Burundi 
with the mission of preparing the rebellion in the east (Kabila in north Katanga and 
Soumialot in Kivu).  On 15 April 1964, the rebellion started in the Ruzizi plain south of 
Bukavu and a month later, Uvira was under the control of the simba (which means lions), 
the rebel forces of the Armée Populaire de Libération (Popular Liberation Army, APL) of 
the CNL.  The rebellion drew its forces from the large population of young, uneducated, 
and unemployed Congolese.  The APL advanced quickly with little resistance from the 
government forces.  The simba were believed to possess magic powers acquired from 
taking a traditional potion that was purported to transform enemy bullets into water 
(Verhaegen, 1969).   
 In two months, the rebels conquered northern Katanga, Maniema, Sankuru and 
the Orientale province.  On 5 September 1964, the “people’s government” of Stanleyville 
was installed in Haut Congo, headed by President Gbenye of the MNC-Lumumba who 
was also president of the CNL.  By the end of September, about half of the country was 
under control of the APL.   
 The rich endowment in mineral resources of the eastern provinces was a major 
motivation and source of financing for the rebellion.  In this respect, the eastern rebellion 
has numerous similarities with the secessionist wars of Katanga and southern Kasai.  
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Furthermore, like the Katangan, southern Kasai, and Kwilu rebellions, the eastern 
rebellion was also supported by a large ethnic base dominated by the Bakusu and 
Batetela. 
 
(iv) Tshombe returns and defeats the rebellion 
 The Adoula government continued to experience instability and its army was 
unable to contain the rebellion.  The government turned to Tshombe (in exile in Spain) 
who still had some influence in the Katanga region and had the backing of Belgian 
officials and private actors.  More important, he had contacts with both the CNL and the 
Adoula government.  Tshombe was believed to be the man who could achieve national 
reconciliation and control the rebellion (Gibbs 1991).  He returned on 26 June 1964 and 
President Kasavubu gave him the mission of forming a transitional government.  To the 
surprise and anger of many, Tshombe’s government did not include representatives from 
key opposition groups, most notably the CNL.  Tshombe rallied his former Katangan 
gendarmes with the assistance of Belgian mercenaries and advisers and with backing 
from the United States and Belgium. The rebels unsuccessfully tried to use white 
hostages to stop the advance of Tshombe’s forces.  Stanleyville was captured on 24 
November 1964, but as many as 200 Europeans and some 46,000 Congolese were killed.6  
The leaders of CNL retreated from the provincial capitals but continued to fight in rural 
areas.  It was only in 1967 that the Orientale province and Maniema province were fully 
controlled by government forces.  The APL retained limited control over some rural areas 
in southern Kivu (Fizi and Baraka) under the command of Kabila.  The rebellion was 
completely defeated by 1968. 
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2.5 Shaba I (8 March 1977–8 May 1977) and Shaba II (13 May–3 June 1978) 
(i) The political context: Mobutu’s regime 
The Shaba wars were the first major challenges to Mobutu’s rule.  When Mobutu 
seized power in 1965, he undertook several initiatives aimed at stabilizing the country 
and consolidating power.  We emphasize four features of Mobutu’s rule that are 
particularly relevant in explaining the causes of civil wars.  First, Mobutu sought to build 
a sense of national identity as a way of consolidating national unity.  In 1971, he initiated 
a radical program known as “authenticity” which aimed at promoting the traditional 
culture and eliminating Western cultural influence.  The name of the country was 
changed to Zaïre and the names of provinces (Katanga becoming Shaba) as well as major 
cities were changed to Zairian names.   
In the mid-1970s, however, “authenticity” evolved into Mobutuism, which 
promoted a cult of personality aimed at legitimizing Mobutu’s absolutism.  To 
consolidate power, Mobutu fused the party and state institutions and placed members of 
his ethnic group in key governmental positions and in the parastatal sector.   This further 
alienated the political elite and antagonized interregional and interethnic relations.   
Second, Mobutu managed to cultivate strong international support for his regime 
by taking advantage of the country’s vast resources and its strategic position in the Cold 
War era.  He became a vital Western ally in the fight against communism in Africa.  Not 
only did Mobutu’s strategy earn him economic and military assistance, it also allowed 
him to get away with repression and human rights violations.   
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Third, starting in 1974, as Mobutu was consolidating his power, he took measures 
to eliminate the political influence of the army.  Four measures are particularly worth 
emphasizing (see Emizet 2000a and Metz 1996 for details).  First, Mobutu replaced the 
general chief of staff with four chiefs of staff heading four autonomous branches of the 
security forces (land forces, air force, coast guard, and the gendarmerie).  Second, 
Mobutu continuously expanded the web of competing and overlapping military and 
security units. His objective was to balance and control the power of these units, while 
encouraging them to oversee each other and repress potential opposition.7  Third, the 
national army (Forces Armées Zairoise, FAZ) was underpaid, irregularly paid, and under 
equipped.  Not only did this situation reduce the military threat to Mobutu’s power, but 
also it rendered the military ineffective in defending the country.   
Fourth, Mobutu deliberately alienated the military politically through the 
intimidation of officers and cooptation of the most influential ones.  In 1974, he 
nominated the chiefs of staff and the captain general of the armed forces as members of  
his party’s political bureau.  Thus, the army became a partner in the regime.  
 
(ii) The economic context: post-Zairianization crisis 
The Shaba wars broke out during the post-Zairianization crisis which was 
characterized by the systematic decline of economic activity.  The economy of the Congo 
underwent four distinct phases following independence: the post-independence growth 
(1960-1974) that continued the pre-independence growth,8 the post-Zairianization crisis 
of 1974-1978, the period of failed adjustment of 1978-1988, and collapse since 1988 (see 
Figure 1 and Table 2).   
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In the period following independence, the Congo continued to experience 
moderate growth as in the pre-independence era.  The economic activity was boosted by 
high copper prices, expansion of mineral production, and the introduction of the first 
IMF-funded economic stabilization program in July 1967.   
Starting in November 1973, Mobutu initiated “Zairianization” whereby foreign-
owned small and medium-size businesses were either nationalized or simply distributed 
to private individuals.  In 1974, Mobutu announced “radicalization,” a program allegedly 
aimed at redressing major economic problems, including unemployment, inflation, social 
injustice, and individualism. However, radicalization resulted in the nationalization of the 
remaining large Belgian-owned companies.  Mobutu took a further step to complete his 
control over mineral resources with the creation of the Société Zairoise pour la 
Commercialisation des Minerais (SOZACOM), which was put in charge of marketing all 
mineral resources. 
 
 18
Figure 1: Real GDP per capita (1996 PPP $) and value added by sector (1995 $)
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The effects of Zairianization and radicalization were devastating (see Emizet 
1997; Young and Turner 1985).  Zairianization damaged private sector confidence at 
home and abroad, undermining international credit worthiness, and thus resulted in a 
sharp decline in private lending.  As private lending declined, Mobutu resorted to 
bilateral lenders, using his position as a strategic ally of the West.  While the government 
accumulated debt, only a fraction of the debt was actually used to finance economic 
development as Mobutu and his entourage channeled borrowed funds abroad in the form 
of capital flight.9   
In the second half of the 1970s, the Mobutu government undertook several 
adjustment programs sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank that aimed at reversing 
the effects of the post-Zairianization crisis and the repercussions of trade shocks.  
However, the effects of these programs were minimal.  Real per capita GDP declined at 
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an annual rate of 1.2% from 1978 to 1988 and inflation continued at an average of 56% 
per annum (see Table 2). 
 
(iii) The 1977 invasion in Shaba 
A large number of the Katangan gendarmes who fought in Katanga and in the 
eastern rebellion fled to Angola where they worked for the Portuguese in the fight against 
liberation movements.  With the victory of the MPLA in Angola, the Katangan 
gendarmes were unemployed and sought to return to the Congo and reclaim their region 
(now named Shaba) under the banner of the Front for the National Liberation of Congo 
(Front pour la Libération Nationale, FLNC).  Initially, the rebels encountered little 
resistance from the disorganized, under-equipped, and demoralized government forces.  
However, before the rebels could capture the mining town of Kolwezi, Mobutu was 
rescued by Moroccan troops which were airlifted by French aircraft in May 1977.   
 
(iv) The 1978 invasion in Shaba 
 After the first Shaba war, Mobutu embarked on a fierce repression mission in 
which dozens of military officers were hastily tried and handed various sentences ranging 
from several years in prison to execution.  These decisions caused high political tension.  
In this context of political tension and economic distress, the second Shaba invasion was 
launched on 3 May 1978 by the former Katangan gendarmes.  This time the FNLC 
declared that its aim was less to conquer Shaba than to remove Mobutu from power.  The 
rebels captured the mining town of Kolwezi on 13 May 1978.   
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 The United States accused the Soviet Union and Cuba of sponsoring the rebellion, 
but no evidence corroborated the accusation (Young and Turner 1985).  The rest of the 
country remained relatively calm during the second Shaba war.  Mobutu was rescued by 
a contingent of 700 French troops and 1,700 Belgian soldiers with logistical support from 
the American Air Force (Young and Turner 1985). 
 
2.6 The Kabila-led rebellion: 17 October 1996 – 17 May 1997 
(i) The economic context: Economic collapse and Western disengagement 
In the second half of the 1970s, the Zairian economy continued to deteriorate 
following the post-Zairianization crisis.  In an attempt to avert total economic chaos, the 
IMF came to the rescue and concluded a new agreement with Mobutu. The IMF forced 
him to settle the country’s debt arrears to the IMF and to bring the IMF-backed Kengo 
Wa Dondo into the government as prime minister with a mandate to resume structural 
adjustment.  In a concerted effort to give Mobutu another chance, the United States, 
Belgium, France, and Germany decided to write off portions of the debts owed by Zaïre.  
 
(ii) The political context 
In addition to economic crisis, the Mobutu regime also faced mounting challenges 
from domestic political opposition.  Mobutu’s reaction to the opposition’s demand for 
reform was intransigent and violent.  In May 1990, when students in Lubumbashi 
protested against Mobutu’s decision to rescind the political reforms announced a month 
earlier, government troops responded by killing 294 students (Emizet 1997: 44).  This 
further alienated Mobutu in the eyes of his Western allies.  In the same year, both the 
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United States Congress and the French Government announced that further aid would be 
conditional upon progress towards democratization.  When Mobutu failed to cooperate, 
the West abandoned him and suspended foreign aid.  It is in this context of economic 
crisis and political chaos that the Kabila-led rebellion broke out in October 1996 and 
eventually toppled Mobutu’s 32-year-long regime in May 1997.   
 
(iii) Trigger factors 
One of the main factors that triggered the rebellion was the influx of more than 
1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refugees in June 1994 following the victory by the Tutsi-led 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).  The refugees included thousands of former Rwandan 
soldiers and the Interahamwe militiamen who committed the Rwandan genocide.   
The influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees had major consequences for the political 
and security situation in the Congo (Emizet 2000).  First, the arrival of refugees altered 
the ethnic balance in the Kivu region by increasing the marginalization of Banyamulenge 
traditionally associated with Tutsi origin.  By colluding with the Interahamwe, rival 
“native” ethnic groups took advantage of this opportunity to settle old antagonisms with 
the Banyamulenge.  Second, the presence of armed Hutu refugees in eastern Congo posed 
a major security threat to the new government of Rwanda.   
In an attempt to gather support from “native” Congolese, the Mobutu regime 
adopted drastic measures against all Kinyarwanda-speaking ethnic groups, the 
Banyamulenge (comprising only Congolese of Tutsi origin) and the Banyarwanda 
(comprising both Hutu and Tutsi).10  On 28 April 1995, the transitional parliament 
adopted a resolution that stripped the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge of their 
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Congolese nationality.  Then in early October 1996, the deputy governor of South Kivu 
ordered the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda to leave the Congo in accordance with the 
1995 parliamentary resolution, but they refused to leave and turned to Rwanda for help.  
The Rwandan government took advantage of this call for help and intervened to resolve 
the security issue by dismantling the refugee camps, which resulted in the massacre of 
thousands of Hutu refugees (Emizet 2000b).11   
This chaotic political situation led to the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de la 
Libération (Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces, AFDL), led by Laurent Kabila, 
staging a rebellion in eastern Congo in October 1996 with military support from Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Angola.  The AFDL combatants included Banyamulenge and other groups 
who were opposed to the Mobutu regime such as the Mai Mai.  For the Banyamulenge, 
the main motivation was to defend their rights to nationality.  For local “native 
Congolese,” the rebellion was a means of overthrowing the Mobutu regime that had 
marginalized and repressed them.  Social tensions among ethnic groups due to land 
disputes also contributed to igniting the rebellion.   
The rebel forces encountered little resistance from Mobutu’s army and were met 
by cheering crowds as they captured towns en route to Kinshasa.  The rebels entered the 
capital city of Kinshasa on 17 May 1997, and twelve days later, Laurent Kabila was 
sworn in as the new president of the Congo.   
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2.7 The anti-Kabila rebellion: 2 August 1998 – ongoing 
(i) The political context 
After he took office, Kabila reinforced the ethnic base of the political system by 
increasing the predominance of people from his native province of Katanga and 
Congolese of Rwandan descent.  The visibility of Banyamulenge in key government 
positions created resentment among other Congolese.  Kabila was seen as an instrument 
of the political and strategic interests of Rwanda and Uganda. 
In late July 1998, Kabila announced the end of military cooperation with Rwanda 
and Uganda and ordered all foreign troops to leave the country.  The Tutsi members of 
the government felt threatened by this move and left the country immediately.  On 2 
August 1998, with the help of Rwanda and Uganda, an anti-Kabila revolt broke out, and 
Kabila’s regime was rescued by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.  The anti-Kabila 
rebellion was strongly opposed by many ethnic groups in Kivu.  Many found that 
whereas the 1996-97 rebellion liberated them from Mobutu, the 1998 rebellion only 
served the interests of Rwanda and Uganda (International Crisis Group, 2003). 
On 16 January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph Kabila 
took over the leadership of a country that was partly occupied by rebel troops and foreign 
forces and suffered from an economy in total chaos.  Rwanda and Uganda played a major 
role in the conflict, directly by the presence of troops on the ground (until they were 
forced to pull out in 2002), and indirectly by sponsoring specific rebel groups.   
 
(ii) The war and the mineral resource-conflict nexus 
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 The two wars of the 1990s in the Congo, especially the anti-Kabila rebellion, 
illustrate the intricate relationships between conflict and mineral resources, and the 
convergence of domestic and international financial interests in perpetuating conflict.  
(See Table 3 for details on the main rebel groups involved.)  Natural resources provided 
incentives to fight to capture the resources and helped reduce the constraints in financing 
war.  Once conflict started, various parties derived gains from the conflict through “war 
economies”; these gains motivated and sustained the continuation of conflict.  
Exploitation of mineral resources blurred the distinctions between economic and politico-
military interests as politically unlikely, but economically rational, alliances formed for 
lucrative purposes.  As a result, ending war became less of a priority. 
There are many channels through which rebel organizations have been able to 
finance and sustain the rebellions.  The first mode of financing war is direct taxation 
whereby the armies and rebel forces extract natural resources using soldiers and forced 
labor.  For example, between January and October 2000, coltan exports through 
comptoirs controlled by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma) 
totaled $6.7 million (International Peace Information Service (IPIS) 2002: 12).  Rebels 
and foreign armies have also financed the war through looting, expropriation, and 
confiscation of mineral resources and other forms of wealth.  Rwandan and Ugandan 
troops established a monopoly over the exploitation and commercialization of mineral 
resources by forcing local entrepreneurs out of business while flooding the region with 
products imported from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (UN Security Council 2001).   
Another financing scheme in the anti-Kabila war is the levy of taxes in the rebels’ 
occupied territories.  This takes the form of in-kind and direct taxation.  For example, the 
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RCD collected a tax of about eight percent of total mineral exports by the comptoirs in 
addition to a $15,000 annual license fee per comptoir (IPIS 2002).  A fraction of the taxes 
collected by the RCD was remitted to Kigali and Kampala as payments for military 
assistance.   
Rwanda and Uganda have earned sizable benefits from the exploitation of natural 
resources in the DRC.  Rwanda’s receipts in taxes on international trade for 1997-1999 
averaged 15.1 billion Rwandan francs, a 31% increase from 1996 (IMF 2001).  The 
official data from these countries reveal important discrepancies between exports and 
production (Table 4). Rwanda’s coltan exports increased from $11.4 million in 2000 to 
$44.5 million in 2001, becoming the largest export for the country (Economic 
Intelligence Unit 2002). 
The DRC government in turn has financed its war effort through a scheme 
referred to as taxe parafiscale, in which state companies are required to hand over a 
fraction of their profits to the government.  The UN Security Council (2001) reported that 
the Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) turned over 40 percent of its earnings to the 
government, while the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES) transferred 
about one-third of its profits to the government. 
The anti-Kabila war was also supported by a network of financial institutions 
based in Rwanda, Uganda, and in developed countries (UN Security Council 2001).  
Rwandan banks have served as the primary suppliers of the cash dollars used to purchase 
minerals by local comptoirs and international traders.12  The trade of natural resources 
involves Western banks as well.  For example, Banque Bruxelles Lambert of Belgium 
has handled the financial operations of Aziza Kulsum (alias Madame Gulamali), a 
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notorious arms and minerals trader and one-time general manager of RCD-Goma’s 
Société Minière des Grands Lacs (SOMIGL).  Citibank of New York also had important 
indirect financial dealings with rebel groups via their suppliers (UN Panel 2001, 
paragraph 132).   
 
3. The case of the Congo and the Collier-Hoeffler model 
3.1 Predictions of the Collier-Hoeffler model for the Congo 
Using a sample of 161 countries, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) provide estimates of 
the risk of war over five-year sub-periods from 1960 to 1999.  The Collier-Hoeffler 
model includes proxies of greed and grievance as explanatory factors.  The Collier-
Hoeffler “core model” includes the rate of secondary school enrollment of males as one 
of the explanatory variables; in the “alternative model,” this variable is replaced by initial 
per capita income.  Collier and Hoeffler find that three economic factors (greed factors) 
are robust predictors of the outbreak of civil war: the initial level of income, the growth 
rate of income, and the share of primary commodity exports in total exports (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002: 15).  Grievance factors (ethnic dominance and social fractionalization) are 
found to play a less important role in predicting civil war.   
Figure 2 illustrates the predicted probabilities of war for the DRC from the 
Collier-Hoeffler study, where each year on the horizontal axis is the beginning year of a 
five-year sub-period.  The Collier-Hoeffler model predicts a higher incidence of civil war 
in the DRC compared to the average in the sample.  The probability of war in the DRC 
ranges from 8% in the 1975-79 period to 77% in the 1995-99 period compared to an 
average of 7% for the sample.   
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Figure 2: Risk of War: Prediction from Collier-Hoeffler (2002)
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Table 5 presents summary statistics for the regression variables for the DRC and 
the sample.13  Except for ethnic dominance, the factors included in the model make the 
DRC more prone to civil war than the typical country in the sample.  The DRC has lower 
values for per capita income, income growth (except for 1970-74), and peace duration, 
while it has higher values for the share of primary commodities in total exports, ethnic 
fractionalization, population, and geographic dispersion of the population, implying a 
higher risk of civil war. 
Among the factors included in the model, income, its growth rate, and 
dependence on primary commodities play a central role in causing conflict in the Congo.  
Low income and low expected economic growth reduce employment and profit 
expectations, which not only decrease the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion, but also 
weaken the government’s ability to counteract the rebellion.   
The dependence on mineral exports makes the DRC prone to conflict due to the 
struggle for control of resources.  The DRC is on the ascending part of the mineral 
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resources dependence curve, below the bliss point of 26% (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 
17).14  However, the Collier-Hoeffler model does not account for regional distribution of 
mineral resources as a mechanism through which mineral resources cause conflict.  As 
discussed in the previous section, it is regional concentration of mineral resources more 
than resource dependence per se that has made the DRC particularly prone to conflict. 
 
3.2 The Collier-Hoeffler model and the trend of the risk of war in the DRC 
 The Collier-Hoeffler model predicts an increase in the probability of civil war in 
the 1990-99 period compared to the previous periods, and an even larger increase from 
1990-94 to 1995-99.  The probability of war jumps from 0.11 to 0.47 in the core model, 
and from 0.25 to 0.77 in the alternative model between 1990-94 and 1995-99.  Thus, the 
Collier-Hoeffler model fits quite well the 1995-1999 civil wars in the Congo. 
 Two factors included in the model may explain the increase in the probability of 
war in the 1990-99 period: per capita GDP and its growth rate.  As discussed in Section 
2, the economy of the Congo began a collapse in 1988.  This would explain the higher 
risk of war in 1990-94 compared to 1985-89.  Income and its growth rate further 
deteriorated in 1995-99.  Per capita GDP dropped from $442 to $375 (a 15% decline) 
while its growth rate worsened from an average of -3.28% to -10.48% per annum.  As 
Table 5 shows, average per capita GDP in the sample was increasing during that period.  
None of the other explanatory factors included in the Collier-Hoeffler model experienced 
large changes that could have caused a significant change in the predicted probability of 
war in the 1990s.  
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 Even though the Collier-Hoeffler model correctly predicts a large increase in the 
risk of war in the 1990s, critical factors that explain this trend are not included in the 
model.  The most important ones are the trigger factors, especially the influx of Rwandan 
Hutu refugees that disrupted the ethnic balance and exacerbated land disputes in eastern 
Congo, the military activity of Rwandan militias that induced Rwanda to take an 
aggressive stand, and the nationality laws that targeted Congolese of Rwandan origin.  
While economic crisis (captured in the Collier-Hoeffler model by per capita income and 
its growth rate) created an environment that facilitated the formation of the rebellions, 
these trigger factors were essential in determining the timing of the onset of rebellions.  
The role of mineral resources in attracting Ugandan and Rwandan military invasion also 
explains the higher risk of war in the 1990s.  This factor is also not captured in the 
Collier-Hoeffler model since this is not reflected in the ratio of mineral exports to total 
exports. 
 
3.3 Summary: Wars predicted by the Collier-Hoeffler model and puzzles to be 
explained 
 
(i) The wars of the 1960s 
We do not have war probability estimates for the period of the 1960s due to lack of data.   
 
(ii) The wars of the 1970s 
The Collier-Hoeffler model correctly and systematically predicts a higher risk of war for 
the Congo than the average country.  The deterioration of economic activity, especially 
following Zairianization, which is accounted for in the Collier-Hoeffler model, was a key 
 30
factor in igniting the rebellions.  The struggle for regional control of mineral resources, 
which is not included in the Collier-Hoeffler model, also played a key role in motivating 
secessionist movements.  A puzzle in this period is that the period 1975-79 has the lowest 
probability of war in the entire sample period although this period had two wars (the 
Shaba wars) and was marked by severe economic crisis.  The data used in the Collier-
Hoeffler model shows a large decrease in the share of primary exports in total exports 
from 0.140 to 0.078.  We find no historical explanation for this decrease.  The model 
would naturally predict a decrease in the risk of war as the share of primary exports 
decreases.   
 
(iii) The 1980s 
The higher probability of war in 1980-85 compared to 1975-79 may be explained by the 
large decline in income (-5.8% per annum compared to -1.5% in the 1975-79 period; see 
Table 5) as well as the higher share of primary commodities compared to 1975-79.  
However, we have no good explanation for the increase in the share of primary 
commodities in this period.  Furthermore, there were no wars in the 1980s.  The 
predictions of the Collier-Hoeffler model for 1980-85 do not seem to be consistent with 
history. 
 
(iv) The wars of the 1990s 
The predictions by the Collier-Hoeffler model of a higher risk of war in the 1990s are 
consistent with history.  The driving factor in the model was the deterioration of 
economic conditions (proxied by the decline in real per capita income and its growth 
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rate).  Coincidentally, the struggle for the control of natural resources by domestic and 
foreign actors, the manipulation of nationality laws, and the influx of refugees, which are 
factors not formally included in the Collier-Hoeffler model, also increased the risk of 
war.  Therefore, we can conclude that the Collier-Hoeffler model predicts quite well the 
wars in the 1990s, even though important factors excluded from the model were critical 
in igniting the rebellions. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper examined the factors that motivated the formation of rebellions, 
secessionist wars, and civil wars in the Congo since independence.  We discussed the 
predictive power of the Collier and Hoeffler (2002) grievance and greed-based model 
with regard to the case of the Congo.  Some factors included in the Collier-Hoeffler 
model are important in explaining wars in the Congo, while a number of critical 
determinants of the timing and location of rebellions are missing from the model.   
The level and growth rate of income influenced the risk of conflict, especially 
through the reduction of the cost of organizing rebellions and also – though to a very 
limited extent – through the weakening of the government’s ability to counteract the 
rebellions.  In the case of the Congo, the government’s ability to face the rebellion 
depended on its external support more than on its own economic capacity.  
Natural resource abundance also increased the risk of conflict in the Congo, 
although the geographic concentration of resources and unequal distribution of wealth 
provided incentives for secession.  The struggle to control mineral resources by domestic 
and foreign actors also contributed to increasing the risk of war in the 1990s. 
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There are important factors that are not formally accounted for in the existing 
models of civil war that are critical in explaining the timing of rebellions and the risk of 
conflict in the Congo.  Three factors are especially worth emphasizing.  First, the identity 
and nationality laws that targeted Congolese of Rwandan descent helped fuel interethnic 
tensions in eastern Congo and provided incentives (or a pretext) for the Rwandan and 
Ugandan regimes to support the rebellions.  Second, the influx of Rwandan Hutu 
refugees in eastern Congo in 1994 disrupted the ethnic balance by marginalizing the 
Congolese of Rwandan Tutsi affiliation.  The third factor is the monolithic nature of the 
Tutsi-dominated regimes in Burundi and Rwanda and the pro-Tutsi orientation of the 
Ugandan regime.  This factor explains the high sensitivity of these regimes to 
discrimination against Congolese people of Tutsi affiliation and their readiness to 
intervene in the Congo.  This factor also explains the opposition to the presence of Tutsi 
elements in Kabila’s first government.  This opposition arose from the perceived risk of 
importing ethnic dominance and ethnic conflicts from Burundi and Rwanda.  
External political and economic interests played an important role on both sides of 
the conflict, as some supported the government while others sided with rebel movements.  
External interests in the Congo were motivated by Mobutu’s strategic position in the 
Cold War geopolitics as well as the country’s mineral resources.  As the Mobutu regime 
fell from grace with regards to its external allies in the early 1990s, its capacity to counter 
the rebellion was severely weakened.  Consequently, the rebellions of the 1990s received 
stronger support from abroad compared to those of the 1960s and 1970s.  This explains 
why the wars of the 1990s have ended either in the victory of the rebellion (in 1996-97) 
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or in a military stalemate (since 1998), whereas in earlier wars the government was 
victorious. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of wars and rebellions 
 
Foreign support Name and 
duration 
Prominent 
leaders 
Ideology and 
political 
objectives 
Ethnic base Size and area 
controlled 
Financing 
sources 
Support to 
rebels 
Support to 
government 
Death 
toll 
Katanga 
secession: 
7/1960 – 
1/1963 
Moise 
Tshombe 
Alleged 
federalist; 
secessionist in 
practice 
Lunda-Yeke; 
Luba; Bemba 
Katanga 
region 
Mineral 
resources; 
Belgium 
Belgium; 
South Africa 
UN forces 80000-
110000 
Kasai 
secession: 
8/1960 – 
2/1962 
Albert Kalonji Anti-
Lumumba 
Luba-Kasai; 
Kuba 
Kasai region Diamonds; 
agricultural 
resources 
None None 2000-
5000 
Kwilu 
rebellion: 
1/1964-
12/1965 
Pierre Mulele 
(ethnic 
Mumbunda); 
Louis Kafungu 
(ethnic 
Mumbunda) 
Pro-Marxist; 
against 
imperialism 
and foreign 
control of the 
economy 
Bambunda and 
Bapenda 
Kwilu region Fully 
supported by 
villagers 
None None 3000-
6500 
Eastern 
Rebellion: 
4/1964-
7/1966 
Gaston 
Soumialot; 
Christophe 
Gbenye; 
Nicholas 
Olenga; 
Laurent Kabila 
(section 
commander) 
Against US-
Belgian 
military 
invasion and 
economic 
exploitation 
Diverse ethnic 
base; 
predominance 
of Bakusu and 
Batetela 
South Kivu 
and North 
Katanga; 
Army = Simba 
- Own 
production of 
grenades and 
land mines;  
- Smuggling 
of minerals 
- Burundi 
(refuge for 
rebels; 
Commanding 
center);  
- Algeria, 
Sudan, Egypt 
USA, 
Belgium 
200 
whites; 
over 
46000 
nationals  
Shaba I: 
3/1977-
5/1977 
FLNC Anti-Mobutu; 
anti-
imperialism 
Lunda-Yeke; 
Luba; Bemba 
Shaba region Mineral 
resources 
Angola Morocco, 
France 
850-1200 
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Table 1 (continued): Characteristics of wars and rebellions 
 
Foreign support Name and 
duration 
Prominent 
leaders 
Ideology and 
political 
objectives 
Ethnic base Size and area 
controlled 
Financing 
sources 
Support to 
rebels 
Support to 
government 
Death 
toll 
Shaba II: 
7/1978-
6/1978 
FLNC Anti-Mobutu; 
anti-
imperialism 
Lunda-Yeke, 
Luba; Bemba 
Shaba region Mineral 
resources 
Angola France, 
Belgium, 
USA 
1000-
3500 
Anti-Mobutu 
rebellion: 
10/1996-
5/1997 
Laurent Kabila 
(with AFDL) 
Opposition to 
Mobutu 
regime 
Banyamulenge; 
Mai Mai 
Large army; 
conquered the 
country 
- Mineral 
resources; 
Rwanda, 
Uganda 
Rwanda, 
Uganda, 
Angola 
None 234000-
237000* 
Anti-Kabila 
rebellion: 
8/1998-
ongoing 
E.W.D. 
Wamba; J.P. 
Ondekane; J.P. 
Bemba 
Anti-Kabila Many groups Kivu; 
Equateur; 
Katanga; 
Kasai 
Mineral and 
agricultural 
resources 
Rwanda, 
Uganda 
Angola, 
Namibia, 
Zimbabwe 
450000-
700000 
 
*This figure includes 232,000 Hutu refugees killed in the Congo (see Emizet 2000b, p. 178).  
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Table 2: GDP growth, value added by sector, inflation and budget deficits, 1960-98  
 
Period  Per capita GDP 
(annual growth 
%) 
Value added in 
agriculture 
(annual growth 
%) 
Value added in 
industry 
(annual growth 
%) 
Value added in 
services 
(annual growth 
%) 
Inflation (CPI, 
% annual 
growth) 
Budget deficit 
(% of GDP) 
1960-1967 -0.3 NA NA NA NA NA
1967-1974 1.5 -3.3 6.2 1.9 21.4 -3.9
(1971-74)
1974-1978 -6.5 -2.7 -8.5 -7.3 51.2 -5.6
1978-1988 -1.2 -0.6 -1.7 -1.3 55.9 -2.1
1988-1998 -7.8 -0.6 -15.8 
(1988-96)
-14.7 
(1988-96)
3367.6 
(1988-97)
-6.1
(1988-97)
 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicators and World Bank Africa Data Base.  The growth 
rates are computed as the annual compounded growth rates between the beginning and the ending year of each sub-period.  
The figures for inflation and the fiscal deficit are simple averages of annual values. 
NA = data not available 
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Table 3: Characteristics of the main rebel movements involved in the anti-Kabila war 
 
Foreign support Name and date 
of creation 
Prominent 
leaders 
Ideology and 
political 
objectives 
Ethnic base Size and area 
controlled 
Financing 
sources 
Support to 
rebels 
Support to 
government 
RCD, 1998 Ernest Wamba 
Dia Wamba; 
Jean Pierre 
Ondekane 
- Unpaid 
soldiers in the 
East. 
- Ethnic 
representation in 
government 
- Ugandan and 
Rwandan 
interests 
Banyamulenge; 
former AFDL 
fighters 
- Large part of 
eastern region 
- Army base:  
11,000 troops in 
2002 
- Mineral 
resources 
 
Rwanda, 
Uganda 
Angola, 
Namibia, 
Zimbabwe 
MLC, 1998 Jean-Pierre 
Bemba 
- Anti-Kabila 
- Ugandan 
security and 
strategic 
interests 
Army base = 
former Mobutu 
presidential 
guard + 
members of 
Equateur ethnic 
groups 
- Equateur 
region; 
- Army base: 
5000-10000 in 
2002 
- Diamonds, 
gold, timber 
- Tax on 
diamond trade 
Uganda Angola, 
Namibia, 
Zimbabwe 
RCD-
Kisangani, 1999 
E.W.D Wamba - Anti-Kabila 
- Uganda and 
Rwandan 
security and 
interests 
Many groups - Kisangani, 
Central-Eastern 
region 
- Army base: 
15000 in 2002 
- Mineral 
resources 
- Foreign 
financial support 
Uganda Angola, 
Namibia, 
Zimbabwe 
RCD-Goma, 
1999 
Emile Ilunga; 
Déo Bugera; 
Adolphe 
Onusumba 
- Anti-Kabila 
- Ugandan and 
Rwandan 
interests 
Many groups - North and 
South Kivu, 
parts of North 
Katanga 
- Army base: 
17000 in 2002 
- Mineral 
resources 
- Foreign 
financial support 
Rwanda Angola, 
Namibia, 
Zimbabwe 
Acronymes: CNL = Conseil National de la Libération; AFDL = Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire; RCD = Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie; MLC = Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo. Since 2002, RCD-Goma split into 3 factions: RCD-Originel, RCD-Authentique, RCD-
Congo. 
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Table 4: Mineral exports by Rwanda and Uganda, 1994-2000 
 
Year Gold production and exports Coltan exports Rough diamonds 
exports 
 Uganda Rwanda Uganda 
(tons) 
Rwanda 
(tons) 
Uganda 
(000$) 
Rwanda 
(000$) 
 Production 
(tons) 
Exports 
(tons) 
Production 
(kg) 
    
1994 0.002 0.22 _ na na na na
1995 0.002 3.09 1 na 54 na na
1996 0.002 5.07 1 na 97 na na
1997 0.006 6.82 10 2.57 224 198 720
1998 0.008 5.03 17 18.57 224 1440 17
1999 0.005 11.45 10 69.50 122 1813 439
2000 0.004 10.83 10 na 83 1263 1788
 
Source: United Nations Security Council (2001), Report of the Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, (12 April 2001). 
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Table 5: Means of variables in the Collier-Hoeffler model for the DRC and the sample 
 
Year pgdp 
sample 
pgdp 
DRC 
gdpcap 
sample 
(weighted)
gdpcap 
DRC
gy1 
sample
gy1 
DRC
sxp 
sample 
(weighted) 
sxp 
sample 
(simple)
sxp 
DRC
1960 - - 2163 489 - - 0.044 0.158 0.076
1965 0.094 - 2518 548 2.71 2.28 0.046 0.162 0.076
1970 0.067 0.131 2968 686 3.19 4.49 0.047 0.165 0.140
1975 0.070 0.111 3236 637 2.42 -1.48 0.057 0.183 0.078
1980 0.070 0.247 3630 476 2.22 -5.82 0.073 0.201 0.112
1985 0.061 0.197 3799 442 -0.43 -1.48 0.056 0.154 0.131
1990 0.058 0.248 3836 375 0.81 -3.29 0.049 0.146 0.141
1995 0.064 0.772 4188 222 0.37 -10.48 0.048 0.142 0.141
 
year frac 
sample 
frac  DRC etdo4590 
sample
etdo4590 
DRC
peace 
sample
peace  
DRC 
lnpop 
sample
lnpop 
DRC
geogia 
sample
geogia 
DRC
1960 1777 5940 0.47 0 157 172 14.98 16.54 0.57 0.61
1965 1777 5940 0.47 0 213 - 15.09 16.68 0.57 0.61
1970 1777 5940 0.47 0 263 51 15.21 16.82 0.57 0.61
1975 1783 5850 0.47 0 301 111 15.32 16.96 0.57 0.61
1980 1788 5850 0.47 0 354 171 15.41 17.11 0.57 0.61
1985 1788 5850 0.47 0 415 231 15.51 17.27 0.57 0.61
1990 1788 5850 0.47 0 454 291 15.61 17.44 0.57 0.61
1995 1788 5850 0.47 0 468 9 15.70 17.59 0.58 0.63
 
Source: Author’s computations from data obtained from Anke Hoeffler. 
Variables: pgdp = predicted probability; gdpcap = per capita GDP; gy1 = lagged GDP growth rate; sxp = share of primary commodities in exports; frac = ethno-
linguistic fractionalization; etdo4590 = ethnic dominance; peace = peace duration before war; lnpop = log of population; geogia = geographic dispersion of the 
population. 
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Table A1: Population by province in 1955 
 
Province Population (and % of total) Relevant features of the province 
 African Non-
African 
Wage 
earners 
(%) 
 
Bas Congo / 
Leopoldville 
2880762 
(23.4) 
 
27203
(29.3)
27.7 - Home of Bakongo ethnic group 
- Rapid industrialization 
(Leopoldville) 
Equateur 1690993 
(13.7) 
 
5453
(5.9)
21.6 - Remote, marginal political and 
economic development 
Kasai 2029486 
(16.4) 
 
 
6881
(7.4)
12.0 - “Diamond state” 
- Home of Kalonji 
- Antagonism between Lulua and 
Baluba 
Katanga 1456383 
(11.8) 
28457
(30.7)
32.6 - Home of Tshombe 
- Mining and industrial 
development 
- Affinity between white 
population in Katanga and the 
white colonists of northern 
Rhodesia 
 
Kivu 1948089 
(15.8) 
 
11266
(12.1)
19 - “White highlands” of the Congo 
(attracting white settlers) 
- Powerful kingdoms 
Orientale 2331613 
(18.9) 
 
13500
(14.6)
23 - Home of Lumumba 
- Rapid urbanization (Stanleyville) 
TOTAL 12317326 92760  
 
Sources: Meriam, Alan P., 1961. Congo: Background of Conflict. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press. Gérard-Libois, Jules, 1966. Katanga Secession. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press 
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1  See Emizet (2001) for further details on these eight wars and other smaller 
rebellions that are not covered in this study.  See Sambanis (2002) for a survey of the 
theory and empirical evidence on the causes of civil wars.  Also see de Soysa (2002) for a 
discussion of the Collier-Hoeffler model and its predictions. 
2 We do not offer war probability estimates based on the Collier-Hoeffler model 
for the period of the 1960s do to lack of data 
3  In January 2002, 41 years after Lumumba’s assassination, Belgium officially 
acknowledged and apologized for its responsibility in the assassination of Lumumba.  
Needless to say, most Congolese regard the apology as a tardy, meaningless diplomatic 
act.  Nevertheless, Lumumba and his ideology remain a galvanizing force among 
opposition movements that seek to project a nationalistic image. 
4 On 10 January 1964, a Constitutional Commission held meetings under the 
leadership of Ileo and adopted a law to be submitted to a referendum.  The project 
proposed a change of the name of the country to Democratic Republic of Congo, 
officially established the 21 provinces as autonomous entities, made the President head of 
the executive branch, and limited control by the Parliament over the government in that 
cabinet members, once confirmed by the Parliament, were answerable only to the 
President. 
5 Refer Verhaegen (1969). 
6De Witte (2001, 164) provides a figure of 200,000 deaths.  This number seems 
quite incorrect because most people in the Kwilu and eastern Congo welcomed the rebels 
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as they were praising Lumumba.  The rebels mostly targeted bureaucrats whom they 
accused of taxing them.  The rebellion itself was against the establishment. 
7 The main security units were the Forces Armées Zairoise (FAZ, the regular 
army), the French-trained 31st Parachute Brigade, and the Israeli-trained Special 
Presidential Division (DSP).  The DSP was regularly paid and was dominated by 
Mobutu’s Ngbandi ethnic group. 
8 The literature often refers to the “growth years” as the period starting with the 
first IMF adjustment program in 1967 and ending with Zairianization and radicalization 
in 1974 (World Bank 1980; Kaplan 1978).  However, the choice of 1967 as a starting 
point is not supported by the historical data. 
9  From 1970 to 1996, the estimated cumulative stock of capital flight from the 
country amounted to $19 billion (see Ndikumana and Boyce 2003; Boyce and 
Ndikumana 2001). Also see Ndikumana and Boyce (1998), Askin and Collins (1993), 
Blumenthal (1982), and Gould (1980) for further discussion of capital flight, corruption, 
and embezzlement of national wealth under the Mobutu regime. 
10 The Banyamulenge are Congolese of Tutsi origin who were separated from 
Rwanda in 1910, when boundaries of the Belgian Congo were redrawn by the colonial 
powers (Emizet 2000b).  The Banyarwanda include natives of North Kivu (Banyabwisha) 
separated from Rwanda in 1910, Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi immigrants who arrived in the 
Congo during the colonial period, and some Tutsi refugees who fled from Rwanda during 
the 1959 ethnic conflict (Willame 1997).   
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11 Estimates of the number of Hutu refugees killed in eastern Congo vary by 
source.  Some sources estimate that over 200,000 Hutu refugees were killed in the 1996-
97 war (Emizet 2000b).  
12 One of the important financial institutions involved in the trade of natural 
resources from the DRC is the Banque de Commerce, du Dévelopment et d’Industrie 
(BCDI) in Kigali.  Created in November 1996, BCDI handled most of the financial 
transactions of the AFDL during the 1996-1997 war. 
13 Per capita GDP values in Table 4 are slightly different from those in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 reports GDP figures (constant PPP 1996 dollars) from updated Penn World 
Tables (for the period 1950-97) whereas Table 4 reports data used in the Collier-Hoeffler 
analysis, that are in 1985 prices from the earlier Penn World Tables (extrapolated for 
1989-99).  The growth rates of per capita GDP in the two series are very close. 
14 The risk of conflict increases as the mineral resources dependence increases up 
to a threshold (or bliss point) beyond which risk of conflict declines. 
